Neuroethics applies cognitive neuroscience for prescribing alterations to conceptions of self and society, and for prescriptively judging the ethical applications of neurotechnologies. Plentiful normative premises are available to ground such prescriptivity, however prescriptive neuroethics may remain fragmented by social conventions, cultural ideologies, and ethical theories. Herein we offer that an objectively principled neuroethics for international relevance requires a new meta-ethics: understanding how morality works, and how humans manage and improve morality, as objectively based on the brain and social sciences. This (...) new meta-ethics will simultaneously equip neuroethics for evaluating and revising older cultural ideologies and ethical theories, and direct neuroethics towards scientifically valid views of encultured humans intelligently managing moralities. Bypassing absolutism, cultural essentialisms, and unrealistic ethical philosophies, neuroethics arrives at a small set of principles about proper human flourishing that are more culturally inclusive and cosmopolitan in spirit. This cosmopolitanism in turn suggests augmentations to traditional medical ethics in the form of four principled guidelines for international consideration: empowerment, non-obsolescence, self-creativity, and citizenship. (shrink)

By John R. Searle Copyright John R. Searle I. Naturalizing Language I believe that the greatest achievements in philosophy over the past hundred or one hundred and twenty five years have been in the philosophy of language. Beginning with Frege, who invented the subject, and continuing through Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Austin and their successors, right to the present day, there is no branch of philosophy with so much high quality work as the philosophy of language. In my view, (...) the only achievement comparable to those of the great philosophers of language is Rawls’s reinvention of the subject of political philosophy (and therefore implicitly the subject of ethics). But with this one possible exception, I think that work in the philosophy of language is at the top of our achievements. Having said that, however, I have to record a serious misgiving I have about the subject. The problem is that its practitioners in general do not treat language as a natural phenomenon. This may seem a strange charge to make, given that so many contemporary and recent philosophers of language are anxious to emphasize the empirical character of their theories of language. Quine and Davidson are striking examples of resolute empiricism. My objection is that few contemporary and recent philosophers of language attempt to treat language as a natural extension of non-linguistic biological capacities. Language is not seen as continuous with, nor as an extension of, the rest of our specifically human biological inheritance. I think there is a deep reason, both historically and intellectually, why language has not been treated naturalistically. It is.. (shrink)

The argument is a dialectical one. It is not a direct proof that the mind is something more than a machine, but a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanism that may be put forward. If the mechanist maintains any specific thesis, I show that [146] a contradiction ensues. But only if. It depends on the mechanist making the first move and putting forward his claim for inspection. I do not think Benacerraf has quite taken the point. He (...) criticizes me both for "failing to notice" that my ability to show that the Gödel sentence of a formal system is true "depends very much on how he is given. (shrink)

“Biological Naturalism” is a name I have given to an approach to what is traditionally called the mind-body problem. The way I arrived at it is typical of the way I work: try to forget about the philosophical history of a problem and remind yourself of what you know for a fact. Any philosophical theory has to be consistent with the facts. Of course, something we think is a fact may turn out not to be, but we have to start (...) with our best information. Biological Naturalism is a theory of mental states in general but as this book is about consciousness I will present it here as a theory of consciousness. (shrink)

In the 1990s, the role of the chief executive officer (CEO) of major United States corporations underwent a profound transformation in which CEOs went from being bureaucrats or technocrats to shareholder partisans who acted more like proprietors or entrepreneurs. This transformation occurred in response to changes in the competitive environment of U.S. corporations and also to the agency theory argument that high levels of compensation by means of stock options helped to overcome the agency problem inherent in the separation of (...) ownership and control. Some critics charge that this new CEO role is objectionable for a variety of reasons, which may also be applicable to the current financial crisis in which CEO misconduct may have played a part. These objections are based largelyon a team production model of corporate governance, which is held by these critics to be superior to the standard agent-principal model. This article examines the objections offered by critics of the changed role of the CEO and argues that their negative assessment of this development and their use of the team production model to support their conclusions are not warranted. CEOs have changed from hired hands to co-owners, and this change may have contributed in some measure to the current financial crisis. However, in determining the morally preferable role of the CEO, care must be taken not to discard what is sound in the changed role. (shrink)

Sustainable farming, and waysto achieve it, are important issues foragricultural policy. New Zealand provides aninteresting case for examining sustainableagriculture options because gene technologieshave not been commercially released and thereis a small but rapidly expanding organicsector. There is no strong governmentsubsidization of agriculture, so while policiesseem to favor both options to some degree,neither has been directly supported. Resultsfrom a survey of 656 farmers are used to revealthe intentions, environmental values, andfarming practices for organic, conventional,and GE intending farmers. The results show thatorganic (...) and conventional farmers are relativelysimilar but contrast to GE intending farmers,especially with respect to perceivedconsequences of each technology. While 75%of farmers have not yet made a commitmentto either technology, one fifth were GEintending and one quarter may become organic.Organic farmers have different attitudes tonature, matched in part by conventionalfarmers. In terms of policy for sustainableagriculture, the results suggest that organicand conventional farmers are incrementallymoving towards agroecological sustainabilitywhile GE intending farmers are committed tointensive production methods of which GEproducts are potentially important. GEintending farmers reject incrementalism infavor of a revolutionary technological fix forsustainability concerns in agriculture.Overall, the results show that there areclearly two different paradigms ofsustainability among farmers. Policies that areseeking to achieve sustainable agriculture needto address the tensions that span the differentparadigms. (shrink)

Christian miller invites further clarification about the relationship between accountability and autonomy. Whereas embracing accountability to others for one’s responsibilities in those relationships emphasizes relationality, autonomy accents the individual’s own capacities to exhibit agency in enacting one’s decisions. Accordingly, we theorize that relational capacities for empathic concern and perspective-taking are especially important in the virtue of accountability. The capacity for self-regulation may serve both one’s autonomous pursuits and accountability for carrying out one’s responsibilities...

Most ethical decisions are conditioned by formidable uncertainty. Decision makers may lack reliable information about relevant facts, the consequences of actions, and the reactions of other people. Resources for dealing with uncertainty are available from standard forms of decision theory, but successful application to decisions under risk requires a great deal of quantitative information: point-valued probabilities of states and point-valued utilities of outcomes. When this information is not available, this paper recommends the use of a form of decision theory that (...) operates on a bare minimum of information inputs: comparative plausibilities of states and comparative utilities of outcomes. In addition, it proposes a comparative strategy for dealing with second-order uncertainty. The paper illustrates its proposal with reference to a well-known ethical dilemma: Kant’s life-saving lie. (shrink)

Abstract:An integrated and principled neuroethics offers ethical guidelines able to transcend conventional and medical reliance on normality standards. Elsewhere we have proposed four principles for wise guidance on human transformations. Principles like these are already urgently needed, as bio- and cyberenhancements are rapidly emerging. Context matters. Neither “treatments” nor “enhancements” are objectively identifiable apart from performance expectations, social contexts, and civic orders. Lessons learned from disability studies about enablement and inclusion suggest a fresh way to categorize modifications to the body (...) and its performance. The term “enhancement” should be broken apart to permit recognition of enablements and augmentations, and kinds of radical augmentation for specialized performance. Augmentations affecting the self, self-worth, and self-identity of persons require heightened ethical scrutiny. Reversibility becomes the core problem, not the easy answer, as augmented persons may not cooperate with either decommissioning or displacement into unaccommodating societies. We conclude by indicating how our four principles of self-creativity, nonobsolescence, empowerment, and citizenship establish a neuroethics beyond normal that is better prepared for a future in which humans and their societies are going so far beyond normal. (shrink)

Cosmology, the study of the universe, has a past, which is reviewed here. The standard model—the Big Bang, or the hot, dense early universe that is still expanding—is based on observations that are basically consistent but which require additional input to improve the agreement. Out of the early universe came the galaxies and stars that shine today. The future of the universe depends on the density of matter: too much mass leads to the Big Crunch; too little leads to eternal (...) expans ion and cooling. The dark‐matter problem prevents us from knowing which will be the fate of the universe. Thelimits of what may be called “scientific” are addressed. (shrink)

In the United States, interest in urban agriculture has grown dramatically. While community gardens have sprouted across the landscape, home food gardens—arguably an ever-present, more durable form of urban agriculture—have been overlooked, understudied, and unsupported by government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and academics. In part a response to the invisibility of home gardens, this paper is a manifesto for their study in the Global North. It seeks to develop a multi-scalar and multidisciplinary research framework that acknowledges the garden’s social and ecological (...) or material dimensions. Given the lack of existing research, we draw on the more extensive literature on home gardens in the South and community gardens in the North to develop a set of hypotheses about the social-ecological effects of urban home food gardens in the North. These gardens, we hypothesize, contribute to food security, community development, cultural reproduction, and resilience at multiple scales; conserve agrobiodiversity; and support urban biodiversity. They may also have negative ecological effects, such as stormwater nutrient loading. Because of the entanglement of the social and the ecological or material in the garden, we review three theoretical perspectives—social ecological systems theory, actor-network theory, and assemblage theory—that have been or could be applied to the multi-scalar and multidisciplinary study of the garden. We also review sampling and analytic methods for conducting home garden research. The paper concludes with a discussion of opportunities to extend the research agenda beyond descriptive analysis, the primary focus of garden research to date. (shrink)

LAS is a program that acquires augmented transition network (ATN) grammars. It requires as data sentences of the language and semantic network representatives of their meaning. In acquiring the ATN grammars, it induces the word classes of the language, the rules of formation for sentences, and the rules mapping sentences onto meaning. The induced ATN grammar can be used both for sentence generation and sentence comprehension. Critical to the performance of the program are assumptions that it makes about the relation (...) between sentence structure and surface structure (the graph deformation condition), about when word classes may be formed and when ATN networks may be merged, and about the structure of noun phrases. These assumptions seem to be good heuristics which are largely true for natural languages although they would not be true for many nonnatural languages. Provided these assumptions are satisfied LAS seems capable of learning any context‐free language. (shrink)

This chapter investigates Spinoza's conception of reason, focusing on (i) the difference between reason and the imagination, and (ii) the difference between reason and intuitive knowledge. The central interpretive debate this chapter considers is about the scope of rational cognition. Some commentators have argued that it is only possible to have rational cognition of properties that are universally shared, whereas intuitive knowledge may grasp the essences of particular individuals. Another prominent interpretation is that reason differs from intuition only in virtue (...) of its form or manner of apprehension, and not in virtue of the content or ideas it apprehends. However, authors on both sides of the debate have held that reason is incapable of grasping singular things. After summarizing the debate, this chapter presents an argument that Spinozan reason is not blind to particulars: it is (at least sometimes) capable of grasping the causal structure that characterizes an individual. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John R. Boly NIHILISM ASIDE: DERRIDA'S DEBATE OVER INTENTIONAL MODELS DERRIDA'S PHILOSOPHY, or perhaps antiphilosophy, emerges from phenomenological thought. But to a great extent, he has been permitted to define that emergence on his own terms, particularly in his writings on Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger. This is, of course, highly questionable. It in effect licenses Derrida to become a revisionist historian of his own origins. So I propose (...) a variation. Instead of placing phenomenology against Derrida's backdrop, I want to question his deconstructive project in its relation to the phenomenological venture. The difficulty with this is apparent. What would such a venture be? Even posing the question raises problems in that it presupposes an impossible vantage, an uninvolved point from which to look down in serene mastery at a game rigged in advance. Yet perhaps a synoptic point ofview may be indulged in for a while, provided no one forgets its provisional nature. In that case, the phenomenological venture includes four moments. 1. Suspension (or epoche). Human beings cannot perceive reality in itself. They can only experience meaning through the operations of intentionality, which may be thought of as the exclusions, selections, and combinations of a mediating system. This truism is no less terrifying for being so true, and every mediating system bears within itselfan impulse towards protective closure, an impulse to veil its own forming activity. Such closure eventually encrusts a mediating system and hardens into what Marxists call ideology, the early Barthes called myth, or contemporary response theorists call repertoire. Suspension involves a questioning attentiveness that remains within the closure it questions. Every fact is reconsidered, as factum, a deed brought forth through a process ofmaking. The consequently bracketed "fact" is both sacred object, granting reflexive ac152 John R. Boly153 cess to its formative process, and utter pretension, trying to conceal that process and thereby promote itself as fact rather than facture, origin rather than product. Phenomenology begins with a questioning of that pretension. Like a difficult child, it is perplexed at the self-evident and wonders at the obvious. 2.Reduction. Yet this questioning attentiveness takes only a first step. Suspension disenchants or disillusions, but it does not advance toward an understanding of the intricate patterns through which meaning emerges from the infinite possibilities of perception. That is the task of reduction, to which Husserl assigned two phases, the eidetic and the transcendental.1 In the eidetic phase, phenomena are released, so far as this is possible, into a preflective and preconceptual mode, as pure perceptions still awaiting the activity of mediation. Here, phenomena are boundless as well as exhilarating in their semantic potential. This return to primary perception, however, generates an opposing phase, the transcendental reduction, which traces the way in which mediating systems or what John Wild called versions of the life-world, select and arrange a potentially infinite semantic potential into actual meanings.2 Eidetic and transcendental phases work together, as inseparable antagonists within a continuous dialectic of disclosure. Because these two phases oppose one another, reduction involves a continuous interplay between energy and order, dynamism and system, with the result that it tirelessly traces patterns in the life-world, yet does so only to modify and transform those patterns through the very act of its tracing. Efforts to set the patterns of a life-world into a stable structure at the same time set free their infinite possibilities.3 The eidetic phase of the reduction thus provides a relentless semantic pressure that qualifies, elaborates, and eventually disperses every order of the transcendental phase. Yet without the revealing provocation of such inadequate orders, the eidetic phase would become incoherent and lapse into a speechless nihilism. Though it enacts a comic drama, reduction is the central task of the phenomenological venture, which halts the instant it is denied access to the intentional realm of the life-world. 3.Opening. So important is this access that it generates a separate moment, which pauses to meditate on the conditions of such access. The issues that arise here dominated Heidegger's thought after Being and Time, and they are among the most abstruse yet important concerns of phenomenology. How can models of intentional patterning be... (shrink)

The community mining space remains contested for a range of complex reasons. This inherently difficult discursive space is made most apparent in the context of international development where mining is often viewed as a potential lever in the effort to lift poorer nations out of poverty. In this article, the authors offer a critical review of community development (CD) approaches that are currently being applied by the mining sector. While the authors acknowledge recent positive developments in this domain, there remains (...) a good deal of scope for improving the internal standing of, and the external influence over, CD practice in mining. Drawing on the contemporary CD literature, the authors assert “assets” as one possible heurism for enhancing this discursive space by highlighting the ways in which community and company representatives may be able to participate more actively in dialogical processes—both between and within company and community—where development discourse is not prefigured or biased against participating parties. (shrink)

In the face of pluralism, moral constructivists attempt to salvage cognitivism by separating moral and ethical issues. Divergence over ethical issues, which concern the good life, would not threaten moral cognitivism, which is based on identifying generalizable interests as worthy of defending, using reason. Yet this approach falters given the inability of the constructivist to provide us a sure path by which to discern generalizable interests in difficult cases. Still, even if this approach to constructivism fails, cognitivist aspirations may not (...) be defeated if we can continue discursively in a project of identifying and appreciating the interests of others. Grasping the interests of others may require a transformation of moral sensibility such that agents recognize values they have not acknowledged before. This view calls for external moral discourse—that is, moral discourse that makes no appeal to an agent's present interests or desires but rather engages in description of the moral situation in hopes of bringing about a change in moral sensibility. (shrink)

In response to Morningstar’s release of carbon risk (CR) scores in May 2018, (environmentally) sustainable mutual funds in the U.S. showed a greater reduction in their portfolio CR relative to conventional funds. The observed causal impact of this third-party disclosure is consistent with the funds’ primary investment objectives. Differences in fund names, potentially driven by marketing considerations, appear irrelevant to the behavior of sustainable funds. Conventional funds that are signatories to the UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) or those with (...) secondary sustainability mandates behave more like other conventional funds rather than sustainable funds. These funds appear relatively insensitive to disclosures as their sustainability considerations are superseded by other primary investment criteria. Fiduciary and legal bonding influences fund managers’ response to sustainability disclosures. Sustainable funds lower their CR score by reducing exposure to fossil fuels, not by increasing exposure to renewables. (shrink)

The idea that oxidative stress may underpin life history trade‐offs has become extremely popular. However, experimental support for the concept has proved equivocal. It has recently been suggested that this might be because of flaws in the design of existing studies. Here, we explore the background to the oxidative stress hypothesis and highlight some of the complexities in testing it. We conclude that the approach recently suggested to be least useful in this context (comparing reproducing to non‐reproducing animals) may in (...) fact be the most powerful. Moreover, suggested alternative approaches of limiting food supply or manipulating litter sizes have many complexities and problems. We suggest some useful alternative approaches that have not been previously advocated, particularly the study of individuals reproducing at greater parity later in life. Finally, the measures of oxidative stress and tissues that are analysed influence the experimental outcome. This suggests our conceptual model of the trade‐off is currently too simplistic, and that studies based on single or limited numbers of assays, or restricted to single tissues, whether they support or refute the theory, should be interpreted with great caution. (shrink)

The twentieth century may be considered the ultimate expression of Western ideals and philosophy: “civilized” man’s attempt to dominate “uncivilized” peoples and nature. The twenty-first century soberingly proclaims the shortsightedness and ultimate unsustainability of this philosophy. This paper shows the limitations of the modern Western worldview, and the practical applicability of ideas to be found in Asian philosophies.

Preview: /Review: Martha Nussbaum, The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal, 310 pages./ For decades Martha Nussbaum allied herself whole-heartedly with cosmopolitanism. No longer. She appealed at length to the righteousness of Stoic cosmopolitanism in past publications such as Cultivating Humanity in 1997. Now, according to The Cosmopolitan Tradition, that founding ideal cannot be right. She presently advocates what may be called “ethical nationalism” since no system of political internationalism could be good enough. A reassessment of cosmopolitanism by this (...) unimpeachable expert must be considered carefully. Despite saying that “cosmopolitanism” is a term “too vague to be useful,” her chapters are replete with tenets taken as essential to this tradition that she must reluctantly abandon. To reach higher for social justice, ethical nations should “Brexit” from frail international systems still failing the multitudes. Rights are global, but enforcement is local. (shrink)

Modern philosophy—perhaps better described as post-Enlightenment philosophy—began to emerge in the later half of the nineteenth century and continued to gain strength in its opposition to the Enlightenment’s insistence on the central role of reason and rational discourse in philosophy. The recent attacks on reason in the name of this or that ideology or “ism” do not strengthen but rather weaken the foundations of equality for women and minorities established through the use of reason. Philosophers—male and female of all races—may (...) take justifiable pride in having been by rational argument, agents of liberation for women and minorities. This achievement should not be jeopardized by the rejection of rational argument and evidence in the name of any currently fashionable movement. (shrink)

SummaryDuring famines females generally have a mortality advantage relative to males, and the highest levels of mortality occur in the very young and the elderly. One popular hypothesis is that the sex differential in mortality may reflect the greater body fatness combined with lower metabolism of females, which may also underpin the age-related patterns of mortality among adults. This study evaluated the ‘body fat’ hypothesis using a previously published and validated mathematical model of survival during total starvation. The model shows (...) that at a given body weight females would indeed be expected to survive considerably longer than males in the absence of food. At a mass of 70 kg for example a female aged 30 would survive for 144 days compared with life expectancy of only 95 days for a male of the same age and weight. This effect is contributed to by both the higher body fatness and lower metabolism of the females at a given body weight. However, females are generally smaller than males and in addition to a sex effect there was also a major effect of body size – heavier individuals survive longer. When this body size effect was removed by considering survival in relation to BMI the sex effect was much reduced, and could be offset by a relatively small difference in pre-famine BMI between the sexes. Nevertheless, combining these predictions with observed mean BMIs of males and females across 48 countries at the low end of the obesity spectrum suggests that in the complete absence of food females would survive on average about 40% longer than males. The energy balance model also predicted that older adult individuals should survive much longer than younger adult individuals, by virtue of their lower resting metabolic rates and lower activity levels. Observations of the female survival advantage in multiple famines span a much wider range than the model prediction. This suggests in some famines body fatness may be a significant factor influencing the mortality differential between the sexes, but in other famines other factors are likely to be more important. Moreover, the pattern of mortality in relation to age is completely opposite that predicted. These data emphasize the complex nature of famine mortality and suggest that a simple model of energy utilization alone is inadequate to explain the major aspects of this phenomenon. (shrink)

Although enterprise risk management (ERM) has many benefits for corporations, there has been virtually no discussion of the extent to which its practice may be said to constitute corporate social responsibility. This article presents a prima facie case for the convergence of the two and examines this case through a consideration of four possible objections or challenges. The conclusion of this article is a tempered optimism that ERM has the significant, but as yet untapped, potential to constitute socially responsible activity, (...) which, if realized, would enable Adam Smith's invisible hand of the marketplace to have an expanded sweep. (shrink)

Evolution fuels interindividual variability in neuroplasticity, reflected in brain anatomy and functional connectivity of the expanding neocortical regions subserving reading ability. Such variability is orchestrated by an evolutionarily conserved, competitive balance between epigenetic, stress-induced, and cognitive-growth gene expression programs. An evolutionary developmental model of dyslexia, suggests that prenatal and childhood subclinical stress becomes a risk factor for dyslexia when physiological adaptations to stress promoting adaptive fitness, may attenuate neuroplasticity in the brain regions recruited for reading. Stress has the potential to (...) blunt the cognitive-growth functions of the predominantly right hemisphere Ventral and Dorsal attention networks, which are primed with high entropic levels of synaptic plasticity, and are critical for acquiring beginning reading skills. The attentional networks, in collaboration with the stress-responsive Default Mode network, modulate the entrainment and processing of the low frequency auditory oscillations and visuospatial orienting linked etiologically to dyslexia. Thus, dyslexia may result from positive, but costly adaptations to stress system dysregulation: protective measures that reset the stress/growth balance of processing to favor the Default Mode network, compromising development of the attentional networks. Such a normal-variability conceptualization of dyslexia is at odds with the frequent assumption that dyslexia results from a neurological abnormality. To put the normal-variability model in the broader perspective of the state of the field, a traditional evolutionary account of dyslexia is presented to stimulate discussion of the scientific merits of the two approaches. (shrink)

From the very beginning, coherent state path integrals have always relied on a coherent state resolution of unity for their construction. By choosing an inadmissible fiducial vector, a set of “coherent states” spans the same space but loses its resolution of unity, and for that reason has been called a set of weak coherent states. Despite having no resolution of unity, it is nevertheless shown how the propagator in such a basis may admit a phase-space path integral representation in essentially (...) the same form as if it had a resolution of unity. Our examples are toy models of similar situations that arise in current studies of quantum gravity. (shrink)

With the advent of social networking websites, privacy concerns have reached a new high. One particularly problematic concern entails employers requesting login credentials to popular social media platforms. While many people may consider this request unethical, they may not agree on the reasons it is unethical. One reason may be to blame the behavior on egoism. Egoism, however, comes in multiple flavors, not all of which would agree that violating privacy is acceptable. In this paper, we articulate how one egoist (...) perspective provides a defense of privacy in the face of unjust information access requests. Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand, offers an egoist approach to ethics that values individual privacy on rational, self-interested grounds. By applying Objectivist principles to a business context, we observe that businesspeople should not violate other people’s privacy for short-term gains. Furthermore, we observe that privacy can be protected without distinct right to privacy. Rather, Objectivism’s conception of rational self-interest suggests that long-term flourishing is the proper end of individuals and businesses, predicated on, among other things, respecting privacy and enforcing individual rights. (shrink)

There is a biological controversy of long standing between proponents of the Wilsonian view that all organisms of a certain class have at least one part that is a cell and proponents of the contradictory, or Dobellian, view that some organisms in the same class have no parts that are cells. The controversy is considered from the standpoint of the methodology of explication. It is concluded that on the grounds of prevalent biological usage, precision, utility and generality the Wilsonian view (...) may be defended successfully against attacks that have been made upon it. (shrink)

One way to recast the problem of cultural explanation in historical inquiry is to distinguish two conceptualizations involving culture: cultural meanings as contents of signification that inform meaningful courses of action in historically unfolding circumstances; and cultural structures as institutionalized patterns of social life that may be elaborated in more than one concrete construction of meaning. This distinction helps to suggest how explanation can operate in accounting for cultural processes of meaning-formation, as well as in other ways that transcend specific (...) meanings, yet are nonetheless cultural. Examples of historical explanation involving each construct are offered, and their potential examined. (shrink)

Manifestly covariant quantum theory with invariant evolution parameter is a parametrized relativistic dynamical theory. The study of parameterized relativistic dynamics (PRD) helps us understand the consequences of changing key assumptions of quantum field theory (QFT). QFT has been very successful at explaining physical observations and is the basis of the conventional paradigm, which includes the Standard Model of electroweak and strong interactions. Despite its record of success, some phenomena are anomalies that may require a modification of the Standard Model. The (...) anomalies include neutrino oscillations, non-locality, and gravity.The two key QFT assumptions that are altered in PRD are the following: fields depend on space and time; and interactions between fields are local. Locality and non-locality refer to the correlation of particles with space-like separation. A local theory does not allow the existence of greater than light speed correlations, while a non-local theory does. PRD is a non-local theory that allows fields to depend on space, time and an invariant evolution parameter. A formulation of PRD is presented together with applications that can be directly compared to results from the conventional paradigm. (shrink)

This paper will discuss the nature of language. I find the present state of the subject, the Philosophy of Language, and the present state of Lin- guistics to be both, for different reasons, unsatisfactory. The problem with the Philosophy of Language is that its practitioners tend to lose sight of the psy- chological reality of language, i.e. of speaking and writing. Historically this is because the Philosophy of Language began with Frege’s logic and has continued to the present day to (...) be heavily influenced by considerations of formal logic. Logicians need not be interested in the psychological reality of logical systems. Frege’s logical system is much more powerful than Aristotle’s, but for all I know Aristotle may be closer to the way people actually think. It does not matter to logicians. (shrink)

This chapter identifies two types of moral dilemma. The first type is described as ethical clash: whether affirmative action is just or unjust, for example, or whether withholding information from an inquisitive relative is honest or dishonest. In these cases the dilemma takes the form of conflict between an ethical predicate and its complement. The second type of moral dilemma is ethical overlap. Instead of a clash between a single predicate and its complement, here two or more predicates apply. Dilemmas (...) associated with white lies, for example, often depart from the recognition that such acts are both dishonest and avoid inflicting pain. Similarly, social dilemmas over progressive taxation may arise despite agreement that progressive systems both decrease liberty and increase equality. Which predicate should take precedence? Strategies for dealing with both types of dilemma are proposed. (shrink)

The Delaware court's decision in eBay v. Newmark has been viewed by many commentators as a decisive affirmation of shareholder wealth maximization as the only legally permissible objective of a for-profit corporation. The implications of this court case are of particular concern for the emerging field of social enterprise, in which some organizations, such as, in this case, Craigslist, choose to pursue a social benefit mission in the for-profit corporate form. The eBay v. Newmark decision may also threaten companies that (...) seek to be socially responsible by serving constituencies other than shareholders at the expense of some profit. This examination of the court decision concludes that a legal requirement to maximize shareholder value may not preclude a commitment to social responsibility and may even permit the pursuit of a social benefit objective, such as the preservation of the culture developed by Craigslist. In particular, the court's decision in eBay v. Newmark reflects unique features of the case that could have been avoided by Craigslist and by other similar companies. (shrink)

This article interprets demokratia and arete as dynamically related terms of political thought in ancient Greek culture, from Homeric times to the end of the classical era. It does so selectively, identifying three stages in which this relationship is developed: from the Homeric to archaic eras; fifth-century Athenian democracy, in which demokratia and arete are posed as complementary terms; and the fourth century era in which philosophers used virtue to critique democracy. Relying mostly on evidence from writers who have become (...) benchmarks in the history of Western political thought, the argument emphasizes the inherently political dimension of arete during this period of ancient Greek culture. Noting different ways in which arete is related to political power in general and democracy in particular, it also illustrates the manner in which arete is neither philosophically pristine nor merely an instrument of practical power. The effect of the research contradicts traditional and recent readings of democracy and virtue as inherently antagonistic. The aim of the article is to identify ancient Greek contributions to understanding the potential, contingencies and dangers of the relationship between democracy and virtue — one which may benefit both democracy and virtue. (shrink)

Most people are aware of the health benefits of being physically active. The question arises then why people so easily fall into sedentary habits. The idea developed here is that sedentary behavior is part of a suite of behaviors to reduce levels of physical activity that were strongly selected in the evolutionary past, likely because high levels of physical activity had direct negative consequences for survival. However, hunter‐gatherer populations could not reduce activity indefinitely because of the need to be active (...) to hunt for, and gather food. Hence they never experienced low levels of activity that are damaging to health, and no corresponding mechanism avoiding low activity evolved. Consequently, gene variants promoting efficiency of activity and increased sedentariness were never selected against. Modern society facilitates reduced activity by providing many options to become less active and divorcing food intake from the need to be active. Choosing the less active option is hard wired in the genes; this explains why being sedentary is so common, and why reversing it is so difficult. Incentivizing activity may be enabled using modern technology, but ultimately may only end up replacing one set of health issues with others. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/ekHbUwPw-v4. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate what I call “ecological value cognition,” a term designating a cognitive process by which one understands: (1) a value or set of values which pertain to the environment, (2) that such values are morally relevant, and (3) that these values may invite or even require virtues, attitudes or actions with respect to them and the entities which bear them. I seek, in this paper, to elucidate the nature of ecological value cognition and suggest specific challenges (...) that the American capitalist ethos poses for understanding these values and therefore for developing a sound environmental ethics and policy. (shrink)

Cosmology, the study of the universe, has a past, which is reviewed here. The standard model—the Big Bang, or the hot, dense early universe that is still expanding—is based on observations that are basically consistent but which require additional input to improve the agreement. Out of the early universe came the galaxies and stars that shine today. The future of the universe depends on the density of matter: too much mass leads to the Big Crunch; too little leads to eternal (...) expans ion and cooling. The dark‐matter problem prevents us from knowing which will be the fate of the universe. Thelimits of what may be called “scientific” are addressed. (shrink)

Having taught management ethics for several years, I have been repeatedly frustrated by the practical mismatch between management problems and moral philosophy…. Unless we can connect ethical theory more closely with management practice, we may be dressing our business curriculum windows with philosophical finery but failing to meet the urgent need for clarity of thought in management ethics.

The standard explanation for the origin of bilateral symmetry is that it conferred an advantage over radial symmetry for directed locomotion. However, recent developmental and phylogenetic studies suggest that bilateral symmetry may have evolved in a sessile benthic animal, predating the origin of directed locomotion. An evolutionarily feasible alternative explanation is that bilateral symmetry evolved to improve the efficiency of internal circulation by affecting the compartmentalization of the gut and the location of major ciliary tracts. This functional design principle is (...) illustrated best by the phylum Cnidaria where symmetry varies from radial to tetraradial, biradial and bilateral. In the Cnidaria, bilateral symmetry is manifest most strongly in the internal anatomy and the disposition of ciliary tracts. Furthermore, the bilaterally symmetrical Cnidaria are typically sessile and, in those bilaterally symmetrical cnidarians that undergo directed locomotion, the secondary body axis does not bear a consistent orientation to the direction of locomotion as it typically does in Bilateria. Within the Cnidaria, the hypothesized advantage of bilateral symmetry for internal circulation can be tested by experimental analysis and computer modeling of fluid mechanics. The developmental evolution of symmetry within the Cnidaria can be further explored through comparative gene expression studies among species whose symmetry varies. BioEssays 27:1174–1180, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The calpactins are a novel group of proteins associated with the membrane skeleton. The two main forms, calpactin I and II, have been shown to bind to the cytoskeletal proteins actin and spectrin, as well as to anionic phospholipids, which may imply some sort of bridging role. By raising monoclonal antibodies to the heavy and light chains of calpactin I, and to calpactin II, the protein subunits were shown to be coordinately expressed, and the existence of separate calpactin pools hypothesized. (...) Calcium‐binding studies suggest that the calpactins may translate Ca2+ signals into cellular responses at the membrane. Structural studies have revealed two distinct domains and are beginning to throw light on heavy‐‐light chain interaction and cytoskeletal attachment. (shrink)

The prevailing opinion in our culture is that bribery is in principle wrong. I challenge that view and offer an analysis that suggests that bribery is a morally neutral concept. The analysis closely parallels the legal notions, suggesting that this analysis may have a firm grounding in our own tradition in spite of the prevailing views. To bribe someone is to offer something of value to another with the intent of inducing an action that is contrary to the positional duties (...) of the office or role of that other person. Whether offering or accepting a bribe is morally correct or incorrect, then, depends entirely upon whether the relevant positional duties have moral backing, all things considered. One virtue of the analysis is that it provides a definition that allows for a cross-cultural comparison that does not impose the standards of one society on those of another but allows for moral judgment. To determine whether a Japanese official has accepted a bribe, for example, one must determine the positional duties of the official as defined in that culture. The analysis also reveals why most believe bribery to be prima facie wrong. This is explained historically by the fact that the concept originally applied exclusively to positional duties in the judicial system, where all believed it to be morally unjustified to transgress duties of impartiality, etc. Finally, the analysis suggests that beliefs about the immorality of commercial bribery rest on the assumption that the positional duties of corporate managers and agents are to abide by the fictitious free-market rules and that the rules of the free market are morally justified. (shrink)

The Christian church has always lived in tension between its global and its local identities, between gospel and culture. One aspect in which this tension plays out is in worship music. As the gospel came to them, many African churches adopted a North American/european form of song, ignoring or neglecting their local, traditional music. They opted for a more global identity and minimized their local identity. The church amongst the Songhai of West Africa is an example of this phenomenon. A (...) church that neglects its local identity, however, has little appeal to the surrounding society and loses its prophetic voice to the community. Resolving the tension between the two identities is an important matter for every church. Thinking through worship music practices plays a key part in resolving this tension. A tool called the ‘logophonic’ principle may be of help in this regard. The tool looks at both words and sounds to reexamine and renew worship practices and craft new music for congregations. This article explains how this tool might work and urges the necessity of good theological thinking and about worship and worship music. (shrink)

One conclusion has already been reached, namely, the diagnosis of the problems of Rousseau's political thought. Again, this is not to say that Locke or Hobbes is correct and Rousseau incorrect, but only to observe that one cannot mix myths without getting into the deepest trouble. But there are several other observations of a more general nature that I want to make. First, the considerations introduced above are intended to point out something of the character of the language of political (...) theory. It is an error to treat such language as if it were assimilable to the verifiability model of scientific language (this was the mistake of both Hume and Weldon). The language of political theory, such as social contract theory, bears a much closer relationship to religious language than it does to at least that model of scientific discourse, for it is basically mythic in character. Speaking still in terms of the verifiability model of scientific discourse, political theories such as social contract are neither true nor false. If one means by “cognitively meaningful” the same thing as “true or false,” then one would be constrained to say that such political theories are meaningless. But the point is that although such theories cannot be shown to be either true or false in that rather simple-minded way that both Hume and Weldon require, they are in fact meaningful, and cognitively so. The essential difference is that the Hume-Weldon model requires that cognitive discourse be descriptive, while the view here advanced rejects this.It is perhaps worth noting, that the Hume-Weldon (positivistic) model has rather gone out of fashion even in the paradigmatic case of the language of science. The difficulties of the verifiability theory of meaning are legion and are well-known to philosophers of science. The problem is, however, that those difficulties and the more recent developments in the theory of scientific language arising out of those difficulties are not equally well known to all philosophers and not known at all outside philosophy. Thus a great many philosophers and practically all nonphilosophers operate with an outmoded theory of language and this theory, unfortunately, governs most of the discussion about political theory.Second, a problem related to that of verification arises out of a consideration of the relationships among mythic structures. For example, it is sometimes maintained that the American democratic system rests on a certain religious point of view: that we are a Christian nation. I am not concerned to attack or defend this position. I want only to observe that it is conceivable that myths may “stack” in certain ways, that hierarchies of mythic structures are possible, such that under one very general kind of myth (such as Marxism), certain subordinate or lower-order myths are permissible and others are not. Among these high-order myths may be certain metaphysics, such as Spinozism or Platonism, or certain religions. Consequently, in addition to such “verification” procedures as have already been suggested, there may be another, namely, the determination of the compatibility of the given myth with others of higher order. If this is so, then one must be careful not to assume that his particular political myth is compatible with just any other point of view he might hold.Finally, returning once more to Rousseau, there is the difficulty involved in getting out of one myth and into another. Religious thinkers have always known about this, for it is the problem of conversion. But philosophers have tended to think that all one had to do was present some arguments and everyone would come around to that point of view. What has been missed is the blikish element, and this undoubtedly explains why there have been virtually no philosophical conversions by argument. Scientific disputes can usually (though not always) be resolved by the introduction of evidence, but if religious points of view and political myths (like the social contract) are bliks, then they determine what will be accepted as evidence and consequently no evidence will count against them. As I have already said, I think this is too strong. There is a blikish element in myths, but in a very large, although recognizable, sense, they are “verifiable.” Even so, the fact that in myth one is presented with a picture, a drama, of which one is a part and not, as in the descriptive model of scientific language, with a set of propositions of which the knowing subject is independent, this fact, I say, makes all the difference in the world so far as switching positions is concerned. Thus, as Rousseau's case suggests, it is extremely hard to get out of one myth, one blik, one way of looking at the world, and into another. This suggests why Democrats do not often become Republicans, why Buddhists do not often become Christians, and why teen-agers complain that their parents do not understand them. (shrink)

BackgroundAs a discipline, neuroethics addresses a range of questions and issues generated by basic neuroscientific research, and its use and meanings in the clinical and social spheres. Here, we present Part 4 of a four-part bibliography of the neuroethics literature focusing on clinical and social applications of neuroscience, to include: the treatment-enhancement discourse; issues arising in neurology, psychiatry, and pain care; neuroethics education and training; neuroethics and the law; neuroethics and policy and political issues; international neuroethics; and discourses addressing "trans-" (...) and "post-" humanity.MethodsTo complete a systematic survey of the literature, 19 databases and 4 individual open-access journals were employed. Searches were conducted using the indexing language of the U.S. National Library of Medicine. A Python code was used to eliminate duplications in the final bibliography.ResultsWhen taken with Parts 1-3, this bibliography aims to provide a listing of international peerreviewed papers, books, and book chapters published from 2002 through 2016. While seeking to be as comprehensive as possible, it may be that some works were inadvertently and unintentionally not included. We therefore invite commentary from the field to afford completeness and contribute to this bibliography as a participatory work-in-progress. (shrink)

As a discipline, neuroethics addresses a range of questions and issues generated by basic neuroscientific research, and its use and meanings in the clinical and social spheres. Here, we present Part 4 of a four-part bibliography of the neuroethics literature focusing on clinical and social applications of neuroscience, to include: the treatment-enhancement discourse; issues arising in neurology, psychiatry, and pain care; neuroethics education and training; neuroethics and the law; neuroethics and policy and political issues; international neuroethics; and discourses addressing "trans-" (...) and "post-" humanity. To complete a systematic survey of the literature, 19 databases and 4 individual open-access journals were employed. Searches were conducted using the indexing language of the U.S. National Library of Medicine. A Python code was used to eliminate duplications in the final bibliography. When taken with Parts 1-3, this bibliography aims to provide a listing of international peerreviewed papers, books, and book chapters published from 2002 through 2016. While seeking to be as comprehensive as possible, it may be that some works were inadvertently and unintentionally not included. We therefore invite commentary from the field to afford completeness and contribute to this bibliography as a participatory work-in-progress. (shrink)

Commonsense says we are isolated. After all, our bodies are physically separate. But Seneca’s colamus humanitatem, and John Donne’s observation that “no man is an island” suggests we are neither entirely isolated nor separate. A recent discovery in neuroscience—that of mirror neurons—argues that the brain and the mind is neither built nor functions remote from what happens in other individuals. What are mirror neurons? They are brain cells that process both what happens to or is done by an individual, (...) and, as it were, its perceived “refl ection,” when that same thing happens or is done by another individual. Thus, mirror neurons are both activated when an individual does a particular action, and when that individual perceives that same action done by another. The discovery of mirror neurons suggests we need to radically revise our notions of human nature since they offer a means by which we may not be so separated as we think. Humans unlike other apes are adapted to mirror interact nonverbally when together. Notably, our faces have been evolved to display agile and nimble movements. While this is usually explained as enabling nonverbal communication, a better description would be nonverbal commune based upon mirror neurons. I argue we cherish humanity, colamus humanitatem, because mirror neurons and our adapted mirror interpersonal interface blur the physical boundaries that separate us. (shrink)

Ramon Llull was acutely aware of Islamic and Jewish divergences from Christian belief. He undertook a quest for "necessary reasons" to show that, where these belief systems diverged, Christian belief is true. Though largely self-taught, Llull managed three stays at the University of Paris. Encounters between the incandescent Mallorcan and academic orthodoxy contributed hugely to Llull's changing conception of necessary reasons. These changes are abundantly documented in Anthony Bonner's The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull.Llull's understanding of necessary reasons is (...) different in the Ars magna's quaternary phase, its ternary phase, and a post-Art logical phase. In the quaternary phase, necessary reasons are often presented as demonstrative; fully ten works use the term in their title. Although Llull meant 'demonstration' in a sense broader than Aristotle's, Parisian academics objected, mistakenly thinking he was trying to prove dogmas like the Trinity and Incarnation through Aristotelian demonstrations propter quid and quia. As Bonner conjectures, this may be why no work from the ternary phase mentions. (shrink)

It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten; whereas, by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A (...) visual illusion, illusory line motion, was presented and participants were requested to make judgments that reflected what they were aware of. The participants were able to make responses indicating that they were aware of the actual stimulus in some conditions, but only of the illusion in others. This finding supports a claim that the difference between the Orwellian and Stalinesque accounts may be empirically observable, and that both types of events may occur depending on task and stimulus parameters. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to describe an empirical study aimed at examining whether a student’s competitiveness orientation in a negotiation class could be shifted to a more socially responsible collaborative orientation. Several subtle manipulations were made between two different sections of the same undergraduate negotiation class. Data on competitiveness, empathy and perspective taking were collected at the beginning and again at the conclusion of the class. While sample size limited the impact of the findings, the data suggested that (...) the manipulations may have had a positive effect. (shrink)

In this paper I review the dispute over DeGeorge's analysis of the issue of the ethical responsibilities of engineers in large organizations. I argue that this issue is no different than the question of the ethical responsibilities of any other relevantly situated employee because engineers have no special duty to hold paramount the safety of the public distinct from that of others. I demonstrate how critics like Mankin, James, and Curd and May have misread and misinterpreted DeGeorge's position and his (...) argument. I then identify a serious logical problem in DeGeorge, unnoticed by critics, but conclude by defending the spirit of DeGeorge's approach. That spirit recognizes the limitations of attempting to provide necessary and sufficient conditions in response to many questions in applied philosophy. (shrink)